858-546-0183. Blog Experience, Know How, Perseverance & Results. Blog · Visit Our Securities Law Website · About Us … a host of important sounding titles), and investors (customers). If you are an investor and have an account with a FINRA registered securities brokerage firm, your opening account documents undoubtedly require that you arbitrate any dispute concerning your account, and that the arbitration forum and procedures will be those provided by FINRA.
FINRA Arbitration: Some Characteristics | San Diego Securities Law …
May 8th, 2012Posted in Information | No Comments »
Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements are Valid and Must Be Upheld …
May 8th, 2012By Amanda R. Yurechko, Attorney
While the Federal Arbitration Act encourages the use of an arbitration provision in a contract and encourages the use of arbitration as an inexpensive and relatively quick way to resolve disputes, much of the discussion surrounding the use of an arbitration agreement in a nursing home admission agreement is less favorable. Such agreements have been criticized as favoring the nursing home industry and asking elderly residents to give up rights they otherwise have, at a time in the life when they are most vulnerable.
The Supreme Court issued a ruling this past February that no state can impose additional requirements upon arbitration agreements that conflict with the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).[1] In Marmet Health Care Center v. Brown [2], the U.S. Supreme Court considered West Virginia’s requirement that all claims for wrongful death or negligence submitted to arbitration, must be accompanied by a post-dispute arbitration agreement. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals had previously held that, “as a matter of public policy under West Virginia law, an arbitration clause in a nursing home’s admission agreement adopted prior to an occurrence of negligence that results in a personal injury or wrongful death, shall not be enforced to compel arbitration of a dispute concerning the negligence.”[3] The Supreme Court reiterated the federal policy in favor of arbitration as a dispute resolution tool.[4] It also relied upon its recent ruling in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,[5] holding that “when a state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim, the analysis is straightforward: The conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA.” The Supreme Court struck down the West Virginia requirement of a post-dispute agreement to arbitrate, as a prerequisite to compel arbitration.
The debate about post-dispute agreements to arbitrate is far from settled however. Several major arbitration forums limit consumer arbitrations by refusing to handle them or by requiring a post-dispute agreement before they will accept an arbitration of a nursing home matter. As an example, The National Arbitration Forum no longer accepts any arbitration by a commercial entity against a consumer, including a nursing home against its resident. The American Arbitration Association requires this “post-dispute” agreement to arbitrate in a matter against a consumer. Further, Congress is still considering what has been billed as the “Fairness in Arbitration Act,” which seeks to eliminate the use of arbitration agreements in the nursing home-resident relationship.[6]
Notably, the arbitration agreements in the Marmet Health Care Center v. Brown line of cases contained provisions that exempted the collection of the balance due on the account from the requirements of the arbitration provision. When drafting an agreement with consumers, it’s important to consider this type of exemption, in order to streamline the collection and litigation of past-due accounts and avoid the issues raised by the courts regarding arbitration in this context.
While there may be benefits to using an arbitration agreement in general, the collection of a past due account should be exempted in order that the account may be collected quicker, more economically, and with less debate over the need for a post-dispute agreement to arbitrate. With pre-existing arbitration agreements, providers should look to the rules of the specific forum to determine whether they will take the arbitration, and review the procedures of the forum to determine if a post-dispute agreement is required. If post-dispute consent cannot be obtained, in some states, the resident will be deemed to have waived the right to arbitration by failing to raise it in state court litigation. Additionally, if the Arbitration Agreement itself is waived or deemed invalid, in most cases the nursing home can proceed to obtain a judgment under the remaining terms of its admission agreement.
While this is a very broad topic for an article of its own, keep in mind that all is not lost if the Arbitration Agreement cannot be enforced, which we will address in a follow-up advisory shortly. In the meantime, if you have any questions about your facility’s use of arbitration provisions in your admission agreements, or about the case law detailed in this advisory, please contact our office.
[1] 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq.
[2] 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012)
[3] Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp. No. 35494 (W.Va., June 29, 2011
[4] KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 132 S. Ct. 23, 25 (2011)
[5] 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747 (2011),
[6] See S. 987, and H.R. 1873, introduced in the 2011-2012 term.
Amanda Yurechko is an associate in Consumer & Commercial Collections, focused on the Governmental Collections, Healthcare, Commercial Collections and Commercial Business Groups with Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co., LPA. She is based in the Cleveland office. Amanda can be reached at 216.685.1060 and ayurechko@weltman.com.
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25 Plr Articles: Stock Market
May 5th, 2012goo.gl 25 Plr Articles: Stock Market If you are out of content to post to your blog or put to your website, this is absolutely for you.. If you have a website or you know a bit about internet you should know that "Content is the king" Google loves websites which are updated frequently. If you don’t have anything to write here’s an opportunity, these 25 articles are written for you, you’ll have Private Label Rights to these articles. You can; * Change them, * Modify them, * Post them to your blog * Submit to another article site to get traffic, * Use them for press releases, * Use them to create ebooks, reports, * You can even use them for creating a newspaper article * Use them to create autoresponder courses etc. You can use them anywhere for whatever purpose you want. Here’s the list of articles: Are you a stock investor Can I Invest Direct How To Form Stock Club Invest in Technology Final Investing in China investing in green stocks Investing in Utilities Investingintheoilsector Sport Fan Investing stock for gamblers stock Market How to Invest Gold Stock Market How To Pick Broker Stock Market Know Mutual Funds Stock Market What is Hedge Fund Subscribe to Stock Publication The Arbitration Agreement The Greatest Show on Earth Use Your Cupboard As a Stock Picker what are blue chip stocks What is a REIT What is an IPO What is NASDAQ what is the Dow Jones What is the Stock Market Whats the worry about bad mortgages There are 25 articles in this package and considering that <b>…</b>
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Quinn Emanuel Expands its Washington Arbitration Practice – The …
May 2nd, 2012Updated 4:58 p.m.
Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan has expanded its Washington office with the addition of an international arbitration partner, the firm announced Tuesday.
David Orta, formerly a partner at Arnold & Porter in Washington, joins Quinn Emanuel and will serve as the head of the firm’s Washington international arbitration practice.
Orta’s practice is a mix of investor state treaty arbitration, where one side is a government and the other an investor, and international commercial arbitration. Orta, who is fluent in Spanish, has been actively representing companies in Latin America on issues related to investment treaty and commercial arbitration disputes. Recently, he represented the Republic of Guatemala as lead counsel in a case filed by a U.S. railway management company.
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Lex Arbitri – the Indian Arbitration Blog: NLSIR Conference
May 2nd, 2012Discussions on Developments in Arbitration and Related Areas in India and Worldwide
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Daily Decisions: If the CBA States that the Arbitrator Can't … – Ziff Blog
April 26th, 2012Washington State Department of Transportation v. Marine Employees Commission (Division 2, April 18, 2012), addresses an arbitrator’s power to award attorneys’ fees despite clear language in the parties’ collective bargaining agreement that each side should pay its own fees and costs. While the Court of Appeals held that fees could be awarded under such a CBA in the case of an unfair labor practice, that circumstance did not apply here. Accordingly, the Court vacated the arbitrator’s fee award.
Back in 2004, several members of the Marine Engineers’ Beneficial Association (“MEBA,” a union representing ferry employees) sued the Department of Transportation claiming that they were entitled to wages for “watch turnover” — the practice of a new crew meeting with the old crew between shifts to discuss the condition of the vessel, any problems, or other relevant matters. The employees won in superior court, but the Court of Appeals vacated the award, holding that the dispute should have been subject to arbitration under the parties’ CBA. However, in the course of remanding for arbitration, the Court of Appeals specifically held that watch turnover was a “regular, essential, and required work activity” and that the DOT was therefore required to compensate the employees for that work. The Court warned that “whether watch changes are work or whether watch changes must be compensated is not an issue for future grievance or arbitration.”
The Court’s opinion in hand, MEBA filed a grievance arbitration against the DOT seeking wages for watch turnover. MEBA claimed that, in light of the Court of Appeals’s ruling, all the arbitrator needed to do was calculate damages. The DOT disagreed. It argued (1) that the Court of Appeals’s statement was wrong on the law and (2) that the statement was dicta and therefore the issue remained open.
Well, the arbitrator disagreed and ruled in favor of MEBA. It also awarded MEBA its attorneys’ fees. The DOT appealed to the superior court, but fared no better. So the DOT once again appealed to the Court of Appeals. Knowing better than to argue to the Court of Appeals that the Court’s own previous opinion was wrong, the DOT’s appeal was limited to the award of attorneys’ fees.
First, the Court determined that it had jurisdiction to review the arbitration award. Despite the fact that the parties’ CBA and the relevant provisions of the WAC were silent on the issue of judicial review, “judicial review is nevertheless available by petitioning the superior court for a constitutional writ of certiorari.” That’s what happened here, so we’re all good.
Such review, however, is “extremely limited.” The Court determines “only whether the arbitrator acted outside his authority under the CBA in awarding attorney fees to MEBA. . . . But so long as the arbitrator is even arguable construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, the fact that we are convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision.”
Here, the arbitrator’s decision failed to meet that very permissive standard. The CBA “is explicit in relation to attorney fees.” It clearly states that all costs and fees (other than those charged by the arbitrator) “will be paid by the party incurring them.” The WAC and relevant statutory provisions are all in accord.
Despite this clear language, however, the Court of Appeals noted that “state and federal law provide persuasive support than an . . . arbitrator could award attorney fees when a party to collective bargaining commits an unfair labor practice by refusing to collectively bargain in good faith.” (emphasis added). But the Court of Appeals concluded that the conduct here at issue failed to meet that standard.
There are specific procedures for bringing an unfair labor practice claim. The MEBA did not follow those procedures here. Indeed, the MEBA “has never alleged that an unfair labor practice occurred.” Moreover, the arbitration itself was conducted pursuant to the CBA, so it was part of the collective bargaining process, not a refusal to engage in that process. So the award of attorneys’ fees was ultra vires and improper.
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More on the CFPB's request for info about arbitration (CL&P Blog)
April 26th, 2012Readers of this blog may be interested in knowing a little bit more about what the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is asking for in its request for information, which Allison Zieve mentioned in a post earlier today. To put it in a nutshell, the CFPB is not now asking what it should do about arbitration, nor is it yet asking people to provide it with facts or opinions about arbitration. Rather, it is just asking people to tell it what it should ask about arbitration, and where it should look for answers to those questions.
The Dodd-Frank Act gave the CFPB some regulatory authority with respect to the use of arbitration agreements in consumer financial transactions, but first required the agency to conduct a study of the use of arbitration agreements in consumer transactions, and to report the results to Congress. The agency is now asking for comment on what specific issues about arbitration it should study, and how it should go about studying them.
For example, just on the subject of how often arbitration agreements are used, the CFPB wants to know where to turn for information. Credit card agreements are subject to regulatory filing requirements, so it is relatively easy for the agency to determine how often they contain arbitration clauses. But with respect to other types of agreements, it’s not obvious how to get a comprehensive view of how often they require arbitration. CFPB is looking for ideas.
The CFPB also wants to know whether people think it should study a variety of subtopics, including the following:
- How often do arbitration agreements contain particular types of provisions?
- How often do consumers initiate arbitrations? How often do they do so voluntarily, as opposed to being compelled to do so?
- What types of cases are commonly brought in arbitration? What are the outcomes? Are consumers satisfied with them?
- How often to companies initiate arbitration against consumers, in what types of cases, and with what results?
- And the $40,000 question: What effects have arbitration agreements, and such features as class action bans, had on consumers? Do they harm consumers by inhibiting the enforcement of laws regulating consumer finance or benefit them by lowering prices for consumer services?
Again, the CFPB doesn’t want to know the answers to any of these questions yet. It just wants to know whether it should ask them, and, if so, how to go about looking for the answers.
If you have any thoughts, the agency wants them by June 23, 2012!
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Lex Arbitri – the Indian Arbitration Blog: A bit too much of BIT …
April 23rd, 2012Discussions on Developments in Arbitration and Related Areas in India and Worldwide
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SEC Approves FINRA Proposal to Exempt … – ADR Prof Blog
April 23rd, 2012In January, I reported here that FINRA had filed a rule change proposal with the SEC to amend FINRA Dispute Resolution’s Code of Arbitration Procedure to clarify that collective actions are not arbitrable in the forum. The SEC granted accelerated approval earlier this month. The approval order explains that FINRA amended slightly its proposal in response to a comment letter it received from SIFMA (Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association), illustrating the critical importance of the public comment process.
Interestingly, after the April 9 approval order, FINRA further responded to comments in a letter to the SEC dated April 13. In that letter, FINRA expressed concern that SIFMA’s comment letter implied that member firms could require employees to arbitrate employment disputes in a forum other than FINRA, that member firms could preclude collective action claims in any forum, and that member firms could preclude employees from joining multiple claims in a single FINRA arbitration. FINRA wrote to expressly disagree with SIFMA’s position on these points. FINRA is very concerned, and rightly so, that brokerage firms are emboldened by the AT&T Mobility decision and inserting in their dispute resolution clauses in employement and customer agreements further restrictions on their rights to bring, among other claims, class and collective actions.
Last 5 posts by Jill Gross
- SEC Seeks Public Comment on Two FINRA Dispute Resolution Rule Proposals – March 4th, 2012
- Harvard Negotiation Law Review Symposium on ADR Effectiveness – February 20th, 2012
- Penn State Law Symposium on AT&T Mobility – February 20th, 2012
- LEAPSing at your Law School – February 6th, 2012
- Schwab’s Complaint Against FINRA – February 4th, 2012
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The high-water mark of an umbrella clause … – Kluwer Arbitration Blog
April 20th, 2012In a recent award that arguably represents a high-water mark for the operation of an umbrella clause in ICSID jurisprudence thus far, a tribunal comprising Stanimir A. Alexandrov (as President), Donald Francis Donovan and Pablo Garcia Mexia held Paraguay liable to SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. (“SGS”) for failing to pay for services rendered. This case is noteworthy for practitioners because it demonstrates how an investor can, in effect, have its claims arising out of an investment contract readily resolved before a treaty forum through the use of an umbrella clause in a bilateral investment treaty (“BIT”).
I. Background
The facts of the case are similar to previous cases involving SGS. SGS is a Swiss company providing certification services based on pre-shipment inspection of goods. Under a contract entered into between SGS and the Ministry of Finance of Paraguay in 1996 (“the Contract”), SGS was to perform such services for cargoes destined for Paraguay. Sustained attempts by SGS to collect on its invoices failed. There were also alleged oral and written promises by Paraguayian officials to make good on the claimed debt, which were not honoured. SGS commenced ICSID arbitration under the bilateral investment treaty (“BIT”) between Switzerland and Paraguay. The BIT contains an umbrella clause under Article 11.
Paraguay resisted jurisdiction on, inter alia, the basis that Article 9 of the Contract vests exclusive jurisdiction in the domestic courts of Paraguay. In response, SGS argued that it was not advancing any claims under the Contract and was only asserting claims for breach of the BIT (including breach of the umbrella clause). Paraguay further argued that it was improper to defer to SGS’s “labeling” of its claims as being based on treaty rather than contract. In Paraguay’s view, a State’s non-performance of a contract can only give rise to a BIT violation if sovereign interference can be shown.
II. Holding
In passages worthy of note by practitioners, the Tribunal first endorsed the oft-cited distinction between treaty claims and contractual claims, viz, the fact that an act or omission may give rise to a contractual claim does not mean that it cannot also separately give rise to treaty claims. It is for SGS to characterize its claims, and the Tribunal will address each claim to see if they are legally and factually adequate for jurisdictional purposes. The threshold at the jurisdictional stage is whether the facts alleged by a claimant could, if proven, make out a claim under the relevant treaty.
The Tribunal did not accept Paraguay’s argument that “sovereign interference” was necessary to transform a contractual breach into a treaty violation. It opined that, one could logically characterize every act by a sovereign State as a sovereign act, including contractual breaches to which the State is a party. There was no basis why a State’s actions, solely because they occur in the context of a contract or a commercial transaction, are somehow no longer acts of the State.
The Tribunal noted in dicta that, even if SGS had brought contractual claims, the wording of the dispute resolution provision in the relevant Treaty was arguably wide enough to encompass those claims, but difficult issues relating to the forum selection clause in the Contract would have been raised. However, since SGS only brought treaty claims before the Tribunal, the forum selection clause in the Contract would not divest the Tribunal of jurisdiction to hear treaty claims.
The Tribunal next addressed each of the treaty claims to see if they were legally and factually adequate for jurisdictional purposes. On the umbrella clause, Paraguay argued that an umbrella clause is implicated only if the host state abuses its power or exerts undue governmental influence in breaching a contract or any other type of undertaking. Paraguay’s alternative submission was that the claim for breach of the umbrella clause was inadmissible in light of the forum selection clause in the Contract providing for exclusive jurisdiction of the Paraguayan courts.
The Tribunal rejected Paraguay’s arguments in its entirety. The Tribunal first cited the plain and ordinary meaning of the language of the umbrella clause, with Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention requiring respect for the ordinary meaning of the clause. The Tribunal took the view that the umbrella clause before it “establishes an international obligation for the parties to the BIT to observe contractual obligations with respect to investors.” The Tribunal next cited a whole series of reasons to dismiss Paraguay’s alternative submission that the claims under the umbrella clause were inadmissible. The reasons are:
(a) SGS’s claims under the umbrella clause are not co-extensive with claims under the Contract. SGS advanced claims under the umbrella clause not only for breach of the Contract’s payment obligation but also for breach of alleged subsequent commitments by Paraguay’s representatives.
(b) Even to the extent that certain claims under the umbrella clause may be co-extensive with claims under the Contract, any argument that the breach of an umbrella clause will not be assessed under an independent, international law standard under the treaty, but under the Contract, is an argument that goes towards jurisdiction at best. Having rejected that jurisdictional argument, the Tribunal would have to have very strong cause to decline the exercise of its jurisdiction.
(c) It would be incongruous to find jurisdiction on the basis of the umbrella clause but then dismiss the claims based on admissibility grounds, because the effect would be to divest the umbrella clause of its core purpose and effect.
(d) The dismissal of claims under the umbrella clause as inadmissible on the ground that a forum selection clause in the Contract is applicable may, in effect, read an implied waiver of treaty rights into every investment agreement that specifies a dispute resolution mechanism other than ICSID.
(e) Given the significance of investors’ rights under a BIT, and of the international law “safety net” of protections that they are meant to provide separate from and supplementary to domestic law regimes, they should not lightly be assumed to have been waived. If parties to a later-in-time contract could have expressly excluded the right to resort to arbitration under the extant BIT but do not do so, that silence would not be taken as effecting a waiver of treaty rights.
(f) Other provisions of the BIT between Switzerland and Paraguay, such as the dispute resolution provision itself, contemplate that tribunals constituted under it would be deciding contractual matters and therefore should not be rendered inutile.
III. Comment
This is undoubtedly a decision that investors would welcome. The Tribunal’s decision is in marked contrast to two other cases involving SGS over similar facts at hand, namely, SGS v Pakistan decided in 2003 and SGS v Philippines decided in 2004, which need no introduction to many readers. The tribunal in another parallel case involving Paraguay over the same facts, BIVAC v Paraguay, adopted the same approach as the tribunal in SGS v Philippines, reasoning that because the investor’s contract post-dated the relevant BIT, the contract’s forum selection clause should take precedence.
The argument that the claims under the umbrella clause are restricted to breaches based on sovereign conduct was rejected by the Tribunal even though tribunals in El Paso v Argentina and CMS v Argentina have held otherwise. Leaving aside practical difficulties of distinction, the language of the umbrella clauses seen thus far do not justify any distinction between acts that are of a sovereign and acts that are of a non-sovereign character. Moreover, this is consistent with other substantive treaty standards which do not hinge on such a distinction. Both commercial and sovereign conduct are attributable to the State under the international law on state responsibility. Once one accepts that an umbrella clause is a substantive treaty standard as it is meant to be, there is no principled reason why one should enquire about the nature of a State’s conduct for claims under the umbrella clause, when the same is not done for other treaty standards.
It would appear that the current tide of jurisprudence concerning umbrella clauses is in favour of such clauses encompassing host State commitments of all kinds, including contractual commitments as the Tribunal had unequivocally found in the present case. The significance of SGS v Paraguay, however, lies in its holding that, even in the presence of a forum selection clause that the investor had specifically and freely entered into, the tribunal can exercise jurisdiction over claims under the umbrella clause. This holding is premised on the view that treaty rights provide an alternative choice for the investor and should not be easily whittled away. In an important footnote in its jurisdictional award, the Tribunal further observed that:
“There is a serious question whether individuals are capable of waiving rights conferred upon them by a treaty between two States…. Because we would not give effect to an alleged waiver that is merely implied, we need not address the question whether we would have given effect to an express waiver.”
Leaving aside the question of whether any express waiver can be given effect, that a tribunal should not easily give effect to implied waivers must be right. Going back to first principles, once it is accepted that the umbrella clause is an independent treaty standard, it should follow that claims under the umbrella clause, as with any other treaty claims, should be resolved by the treaty forum. The fact that claims under the umbrella clause may be, in effect, identical to contractual claims misses the fundamental point that the umbrella clause itself is an independent treaty standard. A breach of an umbrella clause is a breach of treaty, giving rise to international responsibility. It has been observed that between contractual liability under a national law and international responsibility for breach of treaty, various legal and practical differences exist, spanning interpretation, breach, defences and remedies. This is why it has been said that an approach other the one taken by the Tribunal would effectively render the umbrella clause otiose.
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